

Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative Report to City Council Public Safety and Education Committee September 21, 2011 Update

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I. UCLA Final Report on Comparison City Selection

EVALUATION OF THE SEATTLE YOUTH VIOLENCE PREVENTION INITIATIVE: METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARISON CITY SELECTION

Introduction

The use of a comparison or control group is a widely accepted practice in program evaluation design for assessing impact and effectiveness.¹ Examining trends in the environment in which the intervention was delivered, and also one in which the intervention was not delivered helps account for general social and environmental trends that could potentially impact behavior, lending additional validity to any differences that are observed between the two groups.

The randomized clinical trial is the currently accepted study design for evaluating the effectiveness/efficacy of an intervention. In this "experimental" design, eligible individuals are randomized into two groups, one that receives the intervention, and one that does not. While this design is ideal for scientific validity, it is difficult to implement in community-based interventions. First and foremost, it is generally not feasible to randomize the treatment among communities. Whereas individuals can be randomly assigned to receive either the treatment or an ethical alternative (for example, standard care or placebo); by its nature, a community intervention is often implemented in those areas with the greatest need. Ethical issues arise when there is a need to select from multiple geographic areas with deficits, leaving some communities unserved.

Additional limitations to the use of the randomized design in community interventions relate to the small sample size. In studies of individuals, sufficient numbers of persons must be enrolled in an intervention to ensure that results are statistically valid. The required sample size is a calculated value (often called a "power calculation") that takes into account multiple factors: estimating the level of effect, specifying acceptable levels of different types of errors, etc. As the sample size increases, so does statistical power. Due to logistical, administrative, and cost factors, there is great difficulty in enrolling a large number of communities in community-level interventions, and sample size calculations for communities are often not performed unless clearly indicated.

Given these and other limitations, a "quasi-experimental" evaluation design is an acceptable and frequently used alternative. The geographic region in which the intervention is delivered is deemed the "intervention" or treatment area, and a similar "control" region is then selected to use for comparison. It is not necessary for the comparison region to be similar to the intervention area in all respects, only those that have a bearing on the desired outcome. The goal is to find a comparison site that "matches" the experimental site to the greatest extent possible, such that inferences may be made about the effectiveness of the intervention. The following is the documentation of the methodology used to identify an appropriate comparison city in the formal evaluation of the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative.

Geographic Boundaries

The intervention area consists of three distinct, geo-coded regions identified by the City of Seattle prior to program initiation. These regions are: Central Seattle (27 designated census tracts), Southeast Seattle (13 designated census tracts), and Southwest Seattle (16 designated census tracts). (See Appendix A for a complete listing of census tracts). Once the geographic boundaries were identified, extensive baseline demographic data were collected (see Table 1 for summary). Demographic data were compiled from the 2000 US Census and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey using the Census Bureau's American Fact Finder function. These data were collected on the census tract level, and then subsequently aggregated by region within the intervention area.

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	· · · · · ·	Central	Southeast	Southwest	Combined
Total Population		108,422	72,945	82,451	263,818
Race	Caucasian	61.95	24.53	69.88	54.08
(%)	African American	15.92	22.54	5.92	14.63
	American Indian/Alaska Native	1.04	0.92	1.12	1.03
	Asian/Pacific Islander	11.31	39.16	11.00	18.91
	Other	4.11	5.90	4.38	4.69
Ethnicity(%)	Hispanic	5.67	6.95	7.69	6.66
Gender (%)	Male	52.93	49.74	48.73	50.74
Median Age (Yea	ars)	36.5	36.3	37.5	36.7
Poverty	Average Household Income	\$54,214.04	\$51,965.92	\$67,914.06	\$57,606.45
	Population below Poverty Rate				
	(%)	16.79	9.97	8.21	15.13

Table 1. Summary baseline demographic data for intervention areas^{2,3}

Within the three intervention regions, 32 public elementary schools, 10 public middle schools, and 8 public high schools were identified. Baseline indicators were collected using Report Cards and graduation/dropout statistics from the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction in the state of Washington. (See Table 2 for summary).

Table 2. Summary baseline academic profile for intervention area schools^{4,5}

	%
High School Graduation Rate	70.1
Population on Reduced Lunch	65.2
Middle School Unexcused Absence Rate	2.0
High School Dropout Rate	7.1
Population ESL	12.3

Outcomes

Outcomes to best measure the programmatic success of SYVPI were previously selected by the intervention team: a <u>50% reduction in court referrals</u> for juvenile crimes against persons committed by youth residing in the Central, Southeast, and Southwest areas of the City, and a <u>50% reduction in the number of suspensions/expulsions due to violence-related incidents</u> at five Seattle schools (Madrona K-8 and Denny, Aki Kurose, Madison, Mercer, and Washington Middle Schools).⁶ Tables 3 and 4 include baseline data for these outcomes.

School delinquency measures and court referral trends have been used to assess the impact of other youth violence interventions, and they have been found to be scientifically reliable and valid measures of violent behavior.⁷⁻¹³ These findings support the determination of the city to use court referrals and school disciplinary actions as SYVPI outcome measures.

Table 5. Daseline frequency of juverille court referrals						
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2007-2009 Change	
Central	506	447	368	337	-24.6%	
Southeast	834	745	890	742	-0.4%	
Southwest	368	348	354	424	21.8%	
SYVPI Network						
Totals	1708	1540	1612	1503	-2.4%	
Seattle Non-SYVPI	704	767	671	576	-24.9%	
Total Seattle	2412	2307	2283	2079	-9.9%	

Table 3. Baseline frequency of juvenile court referrals¹⁴

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)	
						% Change 2005-06
	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	to 2009-10
Aki Kurose Middle	149	107	61	106	103	-31%
Denny Middle	103	137	100	118	139	35%
Madison Middle	98	136	149	144	101	3%
Madrona K-8	28	42	26	43	50	79%
Meany Middle	89	123	94	111	0	
Mercer Middle	86	90	103	46	65	-24%
Washington Middle	45	79	82	33	100	122%
Total	598	714	615	601	558	-7%

Table 4. Baseline frequency of school disciplinary actions¹⁵

Risk Factor Identification

Given that court referrals and school suspensions/expulsions are proxy measures of violent behavior, it was necessary to review the risk factors for these outcomes so that these factors could be accounted for in the analysis. These risk factors should be assessed so that any potential sources of confounding may be identified. Controlling for risk factors allows for more valid inferences about the program's overall effectiveness.

For example, if low socioeconomic status is associated with youth violence, using a comparison city that has a dissimilar status would make it difficult to determine if violence-rate changes in the two cities were due to the effects of the program or to the different socioeconomic levels. One way to "control" the effect of the different levels is to find (or "match") a comparison area with similar levels of status (and/or similar levels of other identified factors) when compared to the treatment or intervention area.

In consultation with SYVPI and the evaluation team, the risk factor literature was reviewed. The risk factors for youth violence are complex and multivariate, spanning the entire socio-ecological spectrum (see Appendix B for a partial listing of these factors).¹⁶⁻²¹ The group identified the following factors on which to match in the comparison area: <u>African-American identity</u>, <u>low socioeconomic status</u>, <u>truancy</u>, <u>delinquency</u>, and <u>poor school performance</u>. These factors were then operationalized into the following specific indicators:

- 1. Proportion of population African-American
 - a. Among the general population
 - b. Within the juvenile offender population
- 2. Percent of students on reduced lunch
- 3. Unexcused absence rates within the relevant schools
- 4. Number of juvenile court referrals
- 5. Dropout/graduation rates for area high schools
 - a. Overall
 - b. By ethnicity

No assumptions or implications were made about the relative effect of each of these indicators on youth violence. Rather, these were factors that could potentially be "ruled-out" and were selected based on features such as the availability and accessibility of these variables, their completeness and consistency, their data integrity, etc.

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Risk Factor Prioritization

While the ideal comparison site would be identical to the intervention site on all of the designated indicators for matching, this is particularly difficult in real-world situations. Therefore, the factors are often ranked on the strength of the evidence supporting their relationship to the outcome, and then the highest-ranked factors are given priority during the matching process. The evaluation team created an initial ranking (as listed in the previous section), and then determined if comparable data would be available for both the intervention and comparison sites. This comparability is necessary so that the two sites are profiled as systematically as possible, minimizing the possible influence of reporting bias.

For data comparability, as well as similarities in social and regulatory environments across sites, it was determined that it would be preferable for the comparison site to be located within the state of Washington. U.S. Census data are collected systematically and are relatively reliable for indicating African-American racial group. The Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction gathers school- and district-level data for all of its public schools, and is a reliable and systematic source for the proportion of students on reduced lunch, unexcused absence rates, dropout rates, and graduation rates.

Unlike the other indicators, juvenile court referral data are not captured systematically throughout the state; rather, they are procured and maintained at the county level. SYVPI representatives have a data sharing agreement with the King County Juvenile Court System; however, issues arose with accessibility to the provided data, preventing the evaluation team from accessing any individual-level information. For that reason, the evaluation team contacted the King County Juvenile Court directly. King County Juvenile Court referred the team to the King County Office of Performance, Strategy, and Budget, who provided juvenile court referral records from 2006-2010. These records were then analyzed to produce the indicator of juvenile court referrals, both overall and by ethnicity. In assessing potential comparison sites, individual county juvenile court systems were contacted for comparable information.

Time Period

Formal SYVPI enrollment began July 1, 2009. The team determined that an appropriate time for establishing the "before" period for comparison would be 2007-2008 to avoid any overlap with the Initiative's activities. Theoretically, the "after" period begins after the intervention has ceased, but in situations where the intervention is ongoing, the "after" period usually starts after a sufficient time period has elapsed (generally, long enough for the intervention to have had an effect).

Selecting a Comparison City

Upon the identification and prioritization of the risk factors on which to match comparison sites, the iterative process of identifying a comparison city was initiated. In order to do so, the evaluation team established a tolerance level for each risk factor. Ideally, the difference between the intervention site and the comparison site would be within $\pm 5\%$ for the primary risk factor and within $\pm 10\%$ for the other prioritized factors, but levels can be modified as necessary.

Once the tolerance levels for the given risk factors were established, preliminary data gathering for potential comparison sites began. Among the potential sites considered were Renton, Burien, Bryn Mawr-Skyway, Tacoma, and San Diego. After baseline data were collected and aggregated, San Diego was excluded due to significant differences in demographic composition. Its out-of-state status would have also introduced additional confounding factors. Renton and Burien were similarly excluded due to a much smaller representation of African-American youth and differential rates of socioeconomic status.

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Bryn Mawr-Skyway matched better compositionally, but a holistic view of the locale indicated that the small municipality was not comparable to Seattle. Based on demographic and other similarities, the team identified Tacoma as the most promising comparison site and gathered additional data to further assess the match. All juvenile offending data were procured from the Pierce County Juvenile Court. Table 5 compares the two sites according to the prioritized matching factors.

	Intervention		
Risk Factor	Regions	Tacoma	% Difference
Population Size	263,818	196,118	-
Percent African American – Total Population	14.6	11.7	2.9
Juvenile Offenders	48.6	24.9	(23.7)
Percent Students on Reduced Lunch	65.2	57.0	8.2
Percent Middle School Unexcused Absences	2.0	0.5	1.5
Rate of Juvenile Court Referrals (per 1,000 youth)	22.2	92.0	(-69.8)
High School Graduation Rates - Overall	70.1	70.8	-0.7
African American	77.4	70.7	6.7
High School Dropout Rates - Overall	7.1	6.8	0.3
African American	4.7	8.7	-4.0

Table 5. Comparison of matching for prioritized risk factors

In accordance with the predetermined tolerance levels, the risk factors for Tacoma youth are relatively well-matched with those of Seattle. All of the risk factors fall within ±10% of the intervention region, with two exceptions. Juvenile offenders and court referrals (proportion of juvenile offenders who are African American and overall rates of juvenile court referrals) do not align within 10%. Given that juvenile offending patterns are an identified outcome of the intervention, it is less important for the two sites to match on this factor. These data are a part of the baseline for each of the two sites, so it will be more important to monitor differences in the trends across time than it is for the two sites to be matched at the onset of the intervention.

An additional factor that needed to be considered prior to selecting Tacoma as a comparison site was the existence of its own youth violence prevention initiatives. These initiatives must be appraised in order to ensure the validity of any observed differences in trends between the two cities. If Tacoma were to have a highly active youth violence prevention initiative, its rates of violence might not necessarily reflect general behavioral trends – the rates might be lower because of its own prevention efforts.

Two youth violence prevention activities were identified in Tacoma during the relevant time periods: City Connections (01/2007 - 12/2010)²² and Proteen VIP (01/2009 - 06/2011).²³ City Connections consisted of three primary components: functional family therapy (FFT), aggression replacement therapy (ART), and a male improvement project (MIP), and was "one of the first full-scale projects to use Evidence-Based Programs such as ART and FFT... with a population of middle school youth who have not yet been involved in the criminal justice system".²² (FFT and ART are typically directed to a population of youth offenders.) The stated outcomes of these two Programs were all at the individual level: selfreported attitudes of enrolled youth towards conflict and aggression, complemented by observational analyses by program mentors and facilitators, as well as longitudinal data of the youths' academic performance, school behavior, and criminal involvement.

While the presence of evidence-based programs in a comparison region might seem to preclude its use as a control, several factors mitigated the potential for confounding. According to City Connection's own evaluation report, "one overarching consideration is that the original 'model' [was] intentionally and

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unintentionally changed in many ways". For example, both the criteria and the process for referring youths to the three components changed over time. One of the components (FFT) ended up being discontinued and a second (MIP) "morphed substantially... in content and structure" and "has yet to be tested on any populations". The third component (ART) was "delivered with strong fidelity", but the report again acknowledged that the program deviated from its original target population by "being offered to non-offender youth in a school setting".

The City Connection report further states: "The upshot is that we have not been evaluating the 'same' model over the course of the project. As such it is more difficult to really determine what components are working/not working, and are contributing to youth outcomes."²²

There were similar limitations with Proteen as well. Self-described as "an intensive supervision program that provides a single point of contact for screening, assessment, service integration, and referrals for youth and families",²³ Proteen utilized Intervention Specialists to provide street outreach and to recruit for its programs. The stated outcomes were also at the individual level: reduced recidivism and improved use of community resources among those enrolled.

Of the 118 youth enrolled in Proteen in 2010, only 30 (about 25%) had previous county detention and/or juvenile court experience, making it uncertain which population was being targeted. While all 118 received case management, there was a wide range in the numbers of those receiving services. Only 5% were referred to, and/or received, substance abuse treatment and 14% for mental health counseling (it is unclear how many struggled with these conditions). Thirty percent received job training, and the highest numbers served (45% - 57%) were for education, recreational activities, community education, and mentoring, respectively. There is limited documentation on which (if any) of these programs were evidence-based.²³

These program characteristics differ substantially from the SYVPI program in three ways. **First**, the numbers being served by SYVPI are much more robust. From its enrollment inception in July of 2009 through July of 2011, 1,606 youths have been served (Table 6 below describes the SYVPI population by region. Note that the 2,421 Total Responses is greater than the 1,606 youths served because youths can be in multiple categories, for example, convicted *and* arrested.)

In contrast, Proteen enrolled 118 youth in 2010 and City Connection enrolled 297 over three school years (an average of 99 per school year or about 132 per calendar year). SYVPI has enrolled almost eight times more individuals than each of the other programs. Other factors being equal, a larger study population (sample size) generally lends more credibility to any trends found in data.

		Focus Population							
Network	Convicted of violent offense	Arrested but not detained	School Disciplinary Actions for Violence &/or High Truancy	Victim of Violence or family/friend at risk of retaliation	Total Responses				
Central	53	49	72	311	485				
Southeast	198	215	267	448	1128				
Southwest	81	116	167	444	808				
Total	332	380	506	1203	2421				

Table 6. Enrolled Population of Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative by Region.

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Second, the population served by SYVPI is at higher-risk. The top two priorities in Seattle: 1) "youth convicted multiple times and released from supervision..." and 2) "youth arrested for crimes that do not meet the juvenile detention intake criteria and are released..."²⁴ together account for almost 40% [(332+380-77)/1606] of the population served. Only 25% of Proteen enrollees (and 7% of City Connection)²² meet these criteria. Thus, there is greater fidelity in Seattle; their programs are serving the populations for which they were designed.

And **finally**, Seattle includes community-level outcomes (a 50% reduction in court referrals and a 50% reduction in suspensions/expulsions) in addition to individual-level outcomes. (The other two programs only monitor the individual). SYVPI has the expectation that any beneficial changes on the individual level will likely reverberate out to the community. While the other programs also have the potential to create measurable change at the neighborhood level, that possibility is lower because of the lower numbers being served, and because so few (7% in City Connections) are at higher-risk.

In consideration of all of these factors, the evaluation team believes that despite the presence of youth violence initiatives in Tacoma, the city still has potential as a comparison site. Additional steps to minimize contamination can also be taken during the analysis phase.

Limitations

Several limitations to this methodology exist, primarily as they relate to data availability and overall evaluative strength. The data being used for both baseline and matching characteristics are in aggregate form. This is helpful for assessing general trends within a jurisdiction; however, it does not provide information about behavioral changes on the individual level. Thus, it is difficult to rule out unexpected influences when only aggregated data are used.

In addition, complications with data accessibility arose during the process of identifying a comparison city. As previously noted, the City of Seattle's data sharing agreement with King County Juvenile Court did not allow for data to be shared in any form other than summary statistics. For identifying a comparison site, this is not problematic, as any data gathered for the intervention site must also be available for the comparison site. However, subsequent steps of the analysis would benefit from more detailed, individual-level data. (Note: the evaluation team was recently notified that individual-level data will now be available as a result of an updated court order.)

The proposed evaluation design relies upon the pre-selected outcomes (school disciplinary actions and juvenile court referrals) as the most appropriate measures of program effectiveness. It is possible that other positive outcomes might be occurring, but may not be observed or monitored during the evaluation. For example, a national evaluation of Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS, one of the evidence-based "Model" strategies being replicated by SYVPI) found that participants were one-third less likely than non-participants to "hit someone".²⁵ So if the pre-selected outcome to evaluate BBBS had been truancy, the program would have shown little "effectiveness" (in this case, using truancy as the indicator would have missed out on BBBS's effect on interpersonal violence).

Finally, consideration must be given to the timeframe of the evaluation. Even though formal enrollment began two years ago, it takes some time for a program to "ramp up" and operate at peak efficiency and effectiveness. Behavioral change is not always a timely process, particularly at the community level. An intervention may be having a positive effect, but may require a longer time period before measurable change can be detected. Ongoing monitoring will help to address this limitation.

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Future Monitoring, Data Collection, and Analysis Plan

There are several types/levels of analyses that can be performed; not all are required or necessary but some brief summaries of the analyses are outlined below. (These are recommended for the community-level indicators. Individual-level analyses have been described in detail elsewhere.²⁴)

1) Pre-post analysis, in comparison with the control site. Data from before the intervention is compared with data after the intervention has been initiated (given sufficient time for the intervention to be implemented and have an effect). Several years of baseline data for both Seattle and Tacoma have been compiled.

To further minimize the potential for confounding (from the presence of violence prevention programs in Tacoma), data from 2006 (before the two programs were initiated) should be used as a baseline. Data from 2008 may also be utilized as another baseline reference point (before the start of Proteen, but after the first year of City Connections).

For post-intervention data, an appropriate time point should be selected, distal enough that an effect would be measurable. While time periods for detectable community-level changes vary in the literature (from two years to six or more),²⁶⁻²⁸ a minimum of three to five years is suggested here because of the nature and scope of the intervention. Using five years, post-intervention data after July of 2014 should be able to detect measurable change in community level indicators. The analysis is represented by the graphic below, where the comparison is between (S_2-S_1) and (C_2-C_1) :



- 2) Time trend/series analysis. Community-level data for both sites can and should be periodically reviewed for trends over time. This ongoing monitoring may be constrained by the frequency of available data. For example, school statistics such as graduation or dropout rates are only released annually.
- 3) It would be useful to establish a database or data archive containing the identified risk factors (and other variables of interest), and to update it periodically with the most recent data. The database would facilitate subsequent analysis and ensure that the relevant data are accessible. It is hoped that this brief report will assist in the evaluation of the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative and enable the Initiative to administer the program even more effectively.

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Appendix A - Census Tracts

	Census
Network	Tract
CENTRAL	6100
CENTRAL	6200
CENTRAL	6300
CENTRAL	6400
CENTRAL	6500
CENTRAL	6600
CENTRAL	7300
CENTRAL	7400
CENTRAL	7500
CENTRAL	7600
CENTRAL	7700
CENTRAL	7800
CENTRAL	7900
CENTRAL	8100
CENTRAL	8200
CENTRAL	8300
CENTRAL	8400
CENTRAL	8500
CENTRAL	8600
CENTRAL	8700
CENTRAL	8800
CENTRAL	8900
CENTRAL	9000
CENTRAL	9100
CENTRAL	9200
CENTRAL	9400
CENTRAL	9500

	Census
Network	Tract
SOUTHEAST	9300
SOUTHEAST	10000
SOUTHEAST	10100
SOUTHEAST	10200
SOUTHEAST	10300
SOUTHEAST	10400
SOUTHEAST	10900
SOUTHEAST	11000
SOUTHEAST	11101
SOUTHEAST	11102
SOUTHEAST	11700
SOUTHEAST	11800
SOUTHEAST	11900

	Census
Network	Tract
SOUTHWEST	9600
SOUTHWEST	9701
SOUTHWEST	9702
SOUTHWEST	9800
SOUTHWEST	9900
SOUTHWEST	10500
SOUTHWEST	10600
SOUTHWEST	10700
SOUTHWEST	10800
SOUTHWEST	11200
SOUTHWEST	11300
SOUTHWEST	11400
SOUTHWEST	11500
SOUTHWEST	11600
SOUTHWEST	12000
SOUTHWEST	12100





Appendix B – Risk Factors for Youth Violence

	٠	Male gender
	٠	African-American racial identity
	•	Substance use
	٠	High emotional distress
	٠	Low IQ
ual	•	Poor behavioral control
ivid	٠	Antisocial beliefs and attitudes
lnd	•	Attention deficit, hyperactivity, or learning disorders
	•	Deficits in social-cognitive or information-processing abilities
	•	History of violent victimization
	•	Early aggressive behavior
	•	Exposure to family violence
	•	Treatment for emotional problems
	٠	Association with delinquent peers
	٠	Antisocial peers
er	٠	Social rejection by peers
Ре	•	Weak social ties
	٠	Involvement or membership in gangs
	٠	Lack of involvement in conventional activities
_	•	Poor academic performance
00	٠	Low commitment to school
Sch	٠	Truancy
S		
S	•	School failure
S	•	School failure High family conflict
S	• •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes
S	• • •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices
v s	• • •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices Low parental involvement
s	• • • •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices Low parental involvement Low emotional attachment to parents or caregivers
Family S	• • • • •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices Low parental involvement Low emotional attachment to parents or caregivers Low parental education
Family S	• • • • • •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices Low parental involvement Low emotional attachment to parents or caregivers Low parental education Low parental socioeconomic status
Family S	• • • • • • • •	School failure High family conflict Authoritarian childrearing attitudes Harsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practices Low parental involvement Low emotional attachment to parents or caregivers Low parental education Low parental education Low parental socioeconomic status Parental substance abuse or criminality
Family S	• • • • • • • •	School failureHigh family conflictAuthoritarian childrearing attitudesHarsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practicesLow parental involvementLow emotional attachment to parents or caregiversLow parental educationLow parental socioeconomic statusParental substance abuse or criminalityPoor family functioning
Family S	• • • • • • • • • •	School failureHigh family conflictAuthoritarian childrearing attitudesHarsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practicesLow parental involvementLow emotional attachment to parents or caregiversLow parental educationLow parental socioeconomic statusParental substance abuse or criminalityPoor family functioningPoor monitoring and supervision of children
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Community Family S	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	School failureHigh family conflictAuthoritarian childrearing attitudesHarsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practicesLow parental involvementLow emotional attachment to parents or caregiversLow parental educationLow parental socioeconomic statusParental substance abuse or criminalityPoor family functioningPoor monitoring and supervision of childrenDiminished economic opportunitiesHigh level of transiencyHigh level of disorganized neighborhoods
Community Family S	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	School failureHigh family conflictAuthoritarian childrearing attitudesHarsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practicesLow parental involvementLow emotional attachment to parents or caregiversLow parental educationLow parental socioeconomic statusParental substance abuse or criminalityPoor family functioningPoor monitoring and supervision of childrenDiminished economic opportunitiesHigh concentrations of poor residentsHigh level of transiencyHigh level of disorganized neighborhoodsLow level of neighborhood attachment
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uational Community Family S		School failureHigh family conflictAuthoritarian childrearing attitudesHarsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practicesLow parental involvementLow emotional attachment to parents or caregiversLow parental educationLow parental socioeconomic statusParental substance abuse or criminalityPoor family functioningPoor monitoring and supervision of childrenDiminished economic opportunitiesHigh level of transiencyHigh level of neighborhood attachmentLifestyle and routine activitiesTime spent away from homeUnstructured leisure time
Situational Community Family S		School failureHigh family conflictAuthoritarian childrearing attitudesHarsh, lax, or inconsistent disciplinary practicesLow parental involvementLow emotional attachment to parents or caregiversLow parental educationLow parental socioeconomic statusParental substance abuse or criminalityPoor family functioningPoor monitoring and supervision of childrenDiminished economic opportunitiesHigh level of transiencyHigh level of disorganized neighborhoodsLow level of neighborhood attachmentLifestyle and routine activitiesTime spent away from homeUnstructured leisure timeTime spent with drugs or alcohol

II. SPD Report on Youth Arrests for Violent Offenses



SPD Report on Juvenile Arrests for Violent Offenses 2008 - 2010

SYVPI Area

ARRESTED	2008	2009	2010
Distinct Incidents	349	316	293
Distinct Arrested	362	329	290
Violent Offenses	442	383	351

Non-SYVPI Area

ARRESTED	2008	2009	2010
Distinct Incidents	155	137	153
Distinct Arrested	143	140	136
Violent Offenses	195	167	171

City-Wide

ARRESTED	2008	2009	2010
Distinct Incidents	504	453	446
Distinct Arrested	505	469	426
Violent Offenses	637	550	522

Definitions

Incident: a police report is written Arrested: person is arrested on the call Violent Offenses: see Violent Offense Classification List

Violent Offense Classification List

ARSON-BUSINESS	EXTORTION	ROBBERY-BUSINESS-BODYFORCE
ARSON-OTHER	HARASSMENT	ROBBERY-BUSINESS-GUN
ARSON-RESIDENCE	HOMICIDE-JUST-GUN	ROBBERY-BUSINESS-WEAPON
ARSON-VEHICLE	HOMICIDE-JUST-STRONGARM	ROBBERY-RESIDENCE-BODYFORCE
ASSLT-AGG-BODYFORCE	HOMICIDE-JUST-WEAPON	ROBBERY-RESIDENCE-GUN
ASSLT-AGG-CHILD-BODYFORCE	HOMICIDE-NEG-MANS-BODYFORCE	ROBBERY-RESIDENCE-WEAPON
ASSLT-AGG-DV-BODYFORCE	HOMICIDE-NEG-MANS-GUN	ROBBERY-STREET-BODYFORCE
ASSLT-AGG-DV-GUN	HOMICIDE-NEG-MANS-VEHICLE	ROBBERY-STREET-GUN
ASSLT-AGG-DV-WEAPON	HOMICIDE-NEG-MANS-WEAPON	ROBBERY-STREET-WEAPON
ASSLT-AGG-GUN	HOMICIDE-PREMEDITATED-BODYFORCE	SEX ABUSE MINOR-COMMERCIAL
ASSLT-AGG-POLICE-BODYFORCE	HOMICIDE-PREMEDITATED-GUN	SEX ABUSE MINOR-PROMO COMMERC
ASSLT-AGG-POLICE-GUN	HOMICIDE-PREMEDITATED-WEAPON	SEXOFF-FAIL TO REGISTER
ASSLT-AGG-POLICE-WEAPON	HUMAN-TRAFFICKING-SEX	SEXOFF-OTHER OBJECT
ASSLT-AGG-WEAPON	INTERFERE WITH REPORT-DV	SEXOFF-SODOMY
ASSLT-NONAGG	INTIMIDATING-WITNESS	STALKING
ASSLT-NONAGG-DV	KIDNAP-ADULT	THREATS-BOMB
ASSLT-NONAGG-POLICE	KIDNAP-ADULT-FOR-SEX-ASSAULT	THREATS-DIGNITARY
ASSLT-POLICE ANIMAL	KIDNAP-MINOR	THREATS-KILL
CHILD-ENDANGERMENT	KIDNAP-MINOR-FOR-SEX-ASSAULT	THREATS-OTHER
COLLISION - HIT AND RUN	OBSTRUCT	THREATS-WEAPON
COLLISION - HIT AND RUN - INJU	PROSTITUTION-ASSIST-PROMOTE	VIOL-COURT ORDER
COLLISION - HIT AND RUN -FATAL	RAPE-GUN	VIOL-DV ORDER
COLLISION - VEHICULAR ASSAULT	RAPE-STRONGARM	WEAPON-CONCEALED
COLLISION - VEHICULAR HOMICIDE	RAPE-WEAPON	WEAPON-DISCHARGE
ELUDING-FELONY FLIGHT	ROBBERY-BANK-BODYFORCE	WEAPON-POSSESSION
ENDANGERMENT	ROBBERY-BANK-GUN	WEAPON-SELLING
ESCAPE	ROBBERY-BANK-WEAPON	WEAPON-UNLAWFUL USE

Note: Aligns offenses listed in SYVPI Appendix B with SPD offense list as closely as possible. It should be noted that Burglary was not used in our offense list because SPD's report system doesn't differentiate at the General Offense (GO) report level between a burglary with violence involved (Example: home invasion burglary) and a burglary without violence (example: Burglary while no one is home).



SYVPI Report to City Council 2011



	SYVPI Schools	Non SYVPI Schools
2008 CY	628	530
2009 CY	557	555
2010 CY	558	547
Number of Disciplinary Actions	School	
	SYVPI Schools	Non SYVPI Schools
	-11%	3%

DISCIPLINE REASON
Arranging Fights
Arson
Assault
Bullying, Intimidation, and
Harassment
Dangerous Weapons
Fighting
Firearm
Gang/Hate Group Activity
Robbery
Threats of Violence
Verbal Assault

IV. 2011 Year to Date Report on Investment Area Indicators, as of June 30, 2011

The following Report on Investment Area Indicators is based on the reporting structure set up when the Seattle Youth Violence Prevention Initiative was designed and approved for implementation a little over two years ago. Since that time, the Initiative has evolved and policies, procedures and daily practices have been developed and modified with the goal of creating an efficient and effective system of service delivery and coordination. At this juncture, with two years of implementation experience, SYVPI recognizes that the original reporting format does not fully align with our practice and it may not be designed in a way that clearly conveys appropriate targets and progress toward those targets.

We would like to work with City Council, the Investment Area service providers and relevant department liaisons to revisit this reporting format and develop a new more accurate way to measure progress toward our goals. In light of that intention, please understand that the following 2011 Year to Date Report on Investment Area Indicators may be limited in aptly reflecting Investment Area performance.

,	0		
	2011		
	Planned	June	%
INDICATORS:	Target	Actuals	Completed
Number of eligible youth who complete the Intake and	450	364	81%
Screening process (as evidenced by agreeing to and signing off			
on the goals established for youth/family)			
80% of enrolled youth are still engaged in services at 3 months.	360	353	98%
70% of enrolled youth are still engaged in services at 6 months.	315	149	47%
60% of enrolled youth are still engaged in services at 12	270	463	171%
months.			

Referral, Intake and Screening

Case Management

	2011		
	Planned	June	%
INDICATORS:	Target	Actuals	Completed
Number of youth served in the SYVPI Network Neighborhoods	340	318	94%
Number of unduplicated youth in case management who achieve	227	154	68%
one or more of the following service plan goals: reduced criminal			
involvement, improved school success, increased involvement in			
pro-social activities, increased employability skills, and/or			
engagement in treatment.*			
Number of additional, approved service plan goals achieved	109	77	109

* Approved Service Plan Goals by Goal Type

Aggression Replacement Training

	2011 Planned	June	%
INDICATORS:	Target	Actuals	Completed
Total number of youth referred	58	31	53%
Number of youth who enroll in ART	36	19	53%
Number of participants who increase in pro-social skills	18	8	44%
Number of participants who increase positive behaviors and	18	8	44%
moral reasoning			
Number of participants who demonstrate improved anger	18	8	44%
control			
Number of enrolled participants who attend 70% of ART	18	8	44%
training and learn alternatives to aggression			

Mentoring

INDICATORS:	2011 Planned Target	June Actuals	% Completed
Number of youth participating in mentoring	143	89	62%
Number of new matches in 2011	50	13	26%
85% of middle school matches spend an average of 2 hours together per week	78	55	71%
75% of middle school youth involved in a match for 12 months increase school attendance*	23*		
75% of middle school youth involved in a match for 12 months decrease disciplinary actions.*	23*		
75% of matches last 3 months (includes matches made between October – December 2010 and January – September 2011)	42	28	67%
50% of matches made in 2010 last 12 months	47	21	45%

*Will be assessed at mid-year and at the end of the school year. Dependent on finalized MOA with SPS.

Street Outreach

			June	%
Str	eet Outreach Indicators:	2011 Targets	Actuals	Completed
1)	Number of high risk youth contacted, engaged and/or re-	150	84	56%
	engaged by Outreach Team within Southeast, Southwest			
	and Central Areas			
2)	Number of valid referrals to Initiative completed by	75	11	14%
	Outreach Team			
3)	Critical Incident Response to 100% SPD notifications of	TBD*	26	100%
	violent incidents involving youth or gang members in or			
	from any of the three neighborhoods and filing of follow			
	up reports for all critical incident responses.			
4)	50 middle school youth will participate in Alive & Free	50		
	Violence Prevention classes and will demonstrate reduced			
	involvement in high-risk behaviors and increases in			
	developmental assets and protective factors noted			
	below:**			
5)	50% of youth served in A&F classes will report decreased	25		
	involvement in gang and criminal behaviors			
6)	65% of youth served in A&F classes will increase in school	33		
	attendance and participation.			
7)	65% of youth served in A&F classes will demonstrate	33		
	increased skills in peaceful conflict resolution.			

*Total number of Critical Incidents to OFE by SPD on December 5, 2011. SYVPI Director will correlate this information with YMCA's CIR reports.

**YMCA to use pre/post surveys and attendance/school behavior records to substantiate all performance pay for # 5, 6, and 7 above

Youth Employment

Will be reported after summer employment program data is compiled.

		GTLC		RCC Actuals		SWCC Actuals		Total Actuals
	GTLC	Actuals	RCC	June	SWCC	June	Total	June
Indicators	Target	June 2011	Target	2011	Target	2011	Target	2011
Total Number Initiative youth served in the Extended Hours Programs 3 sites	104 26% Share of SYVPI Youth	99	112 28% Share of SYVPI Youth	245	184 46% Share of SYVPI Youth	112	400	456
Number of Initiative-enrolled youth completing youth-designed/desired EHP-originated or EHP-partner programs (not including single day events or programs that simply use EHP space) (75% of total Initiative youth served)	78	99	84	215	138	112	300	426
Number of Initiative-enrolled youth increasing their attendance in multiple programming (45% of total Initiative-enrolled youth served)	47	17	50	15	83	21	180	53
Number of Initiative-enrolled youth that maintain program participation throughout the year (45% of total Initiative-enrolled youth served)	47	50	50	99	83	43	180	192
Number of Initiative-enrolled youth involved in academic, literacy and enrichment programs (90% of total Initiative-enrolled youth served)	94	39	101	19	165	12	360	70
Number of Initiative-enrolled youth who participate without trespass (65% of total Initiative-enrolled youth served)	68	99	73	215	119	112	260	426
Number of youth-designed/desired EHP originated programs offered with a minimum of 1 month advance notice to Networks and partners.	5	99	5	14	5	8	15	121
Number of Initiative-youth designed and planned special events.*** Initiative youth participating in the planning and design of programs will be considered to be participating in a program.	3	25	3	0	3	0	10	25
Total Units of Service:	342	527	366	822	596	420	1304	1769